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Abstract
Analyzing a large sample of Italian ﬁrms we ﬁnd that the probability of default increases
with size. This contrasts with the common observation, based on measures of exit from business
registry data, that ﬁrms’ death rate is inversely related to the scale of their operation and suggests
a rethinking of the economic role of larger companies.
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11 Introduction
Studies based on business registry data typically ﬁnd that the death rate of ﬁrms rapidly decreases as
size and age increase. Since death or exit are commonly associated to the notion of business failure,
the lesson usually drawn is that aging and increasing in size imply for business enterprises, as for
humans, a more quiet demeanor and a safer conduct. This impression can be deceiving. The reason
restsinthecatch-allmeaningoftheexiteventsrecorded inbusinessregistries. Infact theseeventsare
often associated with a simple relabeling of the economic subject, following changes of ownership
or modiﬁcations of incorporation status. Moreover, even when exit is ‘true exit’, it can correspond
to both negative (bankruptcy) and positive (M&A, voluntary liquidation) outcomes.1 Since the label
’exit’ is likely to mix so disparate events, it cannot be taken as the best proxy when one is interested
into identifying business failures.
In this letter we follow a different approach. We identify potential business failure with ﬁrm
default. A default occurs when obligations are past due more than 90 days or when the creditor
institution considers that the obligor is unlikely to repay its debt in full. Default events are both
a signal of business troubles and a costly condition that should be in principle avoided. Although
defaults are not immediately related with exit, several reasons suggests defaults to represent a good
proxy for failure. Firstly, there is a tight link beteen default and failure. Indeed, the declaration of
default constitutesthe main prerequisitefor initiatinga bankruptcy procedure, and even when formal
bankruptcy procedures are not pursued, it is very likely that defaulting ﬁrms go through a process
of profound restructuring (Shrieves and Stevens, 1979; Hotckiss et al., 2008) eventually leading to
failure. A further advantage of default events rests in their timely nature. Solvency conditions are
strictly monitored by lending banks, and defaults reﬂect the prompt reporting of the insurgence of
critical situations. Instead, exit events reported in business registries usually record the ﬁnal step of
a long procedure started several years before, when the actual bankruptcy, from an economic point
of view, took place.
Taking default as proxy of failure, we investigate how its relative frequency depends on ﬁrm
size, also including age and credit ratings as control variables. The next section describes the data.
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Figure 1: Size and default rate. Left: Empirical size distribution of defaulting versus non defaulting
ﬁrms, 2002. Right: Default probability by size classes, 2002.
Section 3 presents our results. Section 4 provides further comments and conclude.
2 Data and variables
We build a database covering virtually all Italian limited liability ﬁrms active in manufacturing in-
dustries (NACE codes 15-36, Rev. 1.1) over the period 1998 to 2003. Annual ﬁgures on size (as
total sales) and credit ratings are gathered by the Italian Account Data Service (Centrale dei Bilanci,
CeBi), while age is derived from business registry data.
These data are supplemented with default events provided by one of the largest Italian commer-
cial banks. Defaults are represented as a dummy variable taking value 1 if a ﬁrm incurs default in
2003 or 2004, i.e. at the end of the sample period. We focus the analysis on ﬁrms displaying at
least a minimal level of structure and operation, thus we exclude ﬁrms with only one employee and
annual turnover below one million Euros. The ﬁnal dataset contains 33 187 ﬁrms and 161 default
events, amounting to approximately 25% of the defaults taking place in those years in the reference
population of limited ﬁrms.
3 Analysis
We start by comparing the size distribution of non defaulting versus defaulting ﬁrms. Figure 3 (left
panel) reports kernel estimates for 2002, just before default occurs. The two distributions seem
3similar. However, a Fligner-Policello test cannot reject that defaulting ﬁrms stochastically dominate
the non defaulting group (statistic=3.14, p-score=0.002): with a probability signiﬁcantly higher than
50%, a ﬁrm randomly drawn from the population of defaulters is bigger than a ﬁrm randomly drawn
from non defaulters, hinting at a positive relationship between size and default rate. The same
signiﬁcant differences are also observed in 2000/2001, while stochastic equality cannot be rejected
in 1998/1999: as expected, the differences get reduced the farther from the default event.
We then show default rates by size classes (right panel), built according to equipopulated bins
based on ﬁrms’ sales in 2002. The pattern is clearcut: larger ﬁrms display, on average, a larger
default frequency. The same result holds in previous years, even if, again, differences are smaller
the farther from the default event.
Finally, we turn to a parametric analysis. We consider a probit speciﬁcation modeling default
probability conditional on size and two additional controls, age and credit ratings. The inclusion
of age seems mandatory, since age is correlated with size and has been traditionally identiﬁed as a
factor reducing death probability. Credit ratings serves a twofold purpose: ﬁrstly, by summarizing
a large number of qualitative and quantitave indicators, they succinctly account for a wide range of
potential sources of ﬁnancial problems; secondly, by yielding a forecast of ﬁrms’ ability to repay
debts, ratings represent a proxy for access to credit. The CeBi index is particularly reliable on both
respects, given its wide use among Italian banks and the long lasting reputation of CeBi in ﬁnancial
analysis. The index is an “issuer credit rating”, i.e. assessing the obligor’s overall ability to meet
obligations. It assigns each ﬁrm a score from 1 (highly solvable) to 9 (at serious risk of default),
updated every year. In the present study we build three classes: LOW risk ﬁrms (rated 1-6), MID
risk ﬁrms (rated 7) and HIGH risk ﬁrms (rated 8-9).2 Then, for each class, we deﬁne a dummy
variable equal to 1 if a ﬁrm belongs to the class in t, and estimate the following speciﬁcation
p(YT = 1 | Xt) = Φ(β0t + β1t lnSt + β2t lnAGEt + (1)
δ1t LOWt + δ2t MIDt + δ3t HIGHt)
at different time distances to default.
2Results are not sensitive to re-allocation of the 9 original groups into the three classes. See Bottazzi et al. (2009) for
more details and for the inclusion of different ﬁnancial indicators.
4Bootstrap Probit regressions
1999 2000 2001 2002
ln SIZE 0.0021* 0.0018* 0.0058* 0.0064*
ln AGE 0.0012 0.0028 0.0016 0.0047*
CONSTANT -0.3506* -0.4341* -0.3085* -0.1211*
LOW risk -0.0360* -0.0164* -0.0516* -0.1533*
MID risk 0.0168* 0.0453* 0.0219* -0.0142*
Table 1: Probit estimates - Bootstrap means of marginal effects at the sample average of covariates,
variables in z-scores. * Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Since under-weighting of default events is likely to give raise to choice-based sample bias (Man-
ski and McFadden, 1981), we adopt an estimation scheme involving randomized re-sampling (see,
for instance Grunert et al., 2005). Given the low number of default events, we cure possible biases
by performing a sector-wide (2-Digit level) stratiﬁed resampling of non defaulters, keeping the ratio
of defaulting over non defaulting ﬁrms equal to the ofﬁcial population-wide default rates reported
by the Italian Chambers of Commerce at this level of sectoral aggregation. The sampling procedure
is repeated several times with replacement. Averaging over the number of runs then yields robust
point estimates and estimation errors.
Table 1 reports results based on 200 independent replications, which turned out to be a large
enough bootstrap sample to achieve convergence.3 The impact of size is signiﬁcant and positive, in-
creases the nearer to default and, notwithstanding the expected huge effect exerted by credit ratings,
remains signiﬁcant when controls are included. Conversely, age seems a much poorer predictor of
default, and exerts its effect only over the very short run.4
4 Conclusion
We have found that biggerﬁrms are more prone to incur the extremeﬁnancial distress represented by
default events. This seemingly contrasts with the often reported evidence that smaller ﬁrms are more
3Sectoral dummies are also included, but not reported because non signiﬁcant.
4Given the possible nonlinear effects suggested by Figure 3, we also experimented with a quadratic term for size,
ln 2(St). Results conﬁrmed the positive effect of size, while the other coefﬁcients remain practically unchanged.
5likely to exit. However, since bankruptcies represent but a minimal part of exits (consider a typical
industrial turnover of about 1-2% against an average bankruptcy rate of 0 5%5) as long as other exit
causes are more abundant among younger ﬁrms, they can explain alone the observed exit-size re-
lationship. In any case, our result that default rates increase with size tells that while bigger ﬁrms
can be more successful than smaller ﬁrms in recovering from default and thus in avoiding exit, they
are nonetheless more likely to experience severe problems leading to default. Adding to previous
studies on similar data, ﬁnding weak linkages between ﬁrm growth and operating performance (Bot-
tazzi et al., 2010) and a positive relationship between unit labor cost and size (Bottazzi and Grazzi,
2010), we conclude that bigger ﬁrms’ resilience to exit does not necessarily associate with a real op-
erating advantage. The recovering ability of bigger ﬁrms seems thus much more likely to arise from
inefﬁciency factors, such as excessive market power and preferential credit channels, or from exter-
nal helps justiﬁed by (perfectly legitimate) political considerations about the social consequences of
failures.
Our results bear relevant implications about the actual economic role of bigger ﬁrms, at least in
Italy. Default events are unanticipated and costly. The pressure generated by lenders is likely to
promote possibly disruptive divestment, hinder long-term commercial relationships with customers
and suppliers, and ultimately generate losses for owners and employees. These events should be
in principle avoided. The ﬁnding that small-medium enterprises seem as good as larger ones, if
not better, in avoiding such conditions of extreme ﬁnancial distress suggests to revise the common
wisdom, often prevailing in the political arena, that bigger ﬁrms represent an essential asset which
should be preserved at any cost.
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